☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:			EXTENSION	NO.	
Director of Security Room 4E-60, Hdqs.				DATE 8 JUL 1965	STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)	
1. DDI Rm. 7E-32, Hdqs.			12 Jul		STAT
2. Chief DDI Admin Staff				For preparation or discussion of appropriate implementing instructions.	STAT
3.					STAT
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.				253	
9.				Would you	
10.				see me on	STAT
11.				7/15 about this?	
12.				Thanks.	STAT
13.					
14.				Hold - for Security notice re: Reptod, and indication of Agency-wide policy re: this. OS may put out policy for all directorates.	
15.					STAT

~~SECRET~~

DDI-2335-65

8 JUL 1965

PAB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Implementation of the Task Force Study
"Review of Top Secret and Code Word
Procedures and Controls"

     1. As will be noted, the Executive Director-Comptroller approved eight of the nine recommendations in the attached study.

     2. To implement the study, it is necessary that your Directorate take action on Recommendations #1(c) and #9.

     3. It is anticipated that a progress report will be made to the Executive Director-Comptroller on or about 1 June 1966 on the implementation of the study.

STAT

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment:
   As Stated

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

DD/ST# *1691-65*

9 MAR 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Review of Top Secret and Code Word
Procedures and Controls

In compliance with your oral request I am submitting
the report of the Committee on the review of Top Secret and
Code Word Procedures and Controls. The recommendations
contained herein that are the responsibility of the Office of
Security are being or will be put into effect.

STAT

Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment:
As Stated

SECRET

SECRET

CONCURRENCES:

STAT

2D Man 65
Deputy Director for Support   Date

STAT

25 Mar 65
Deputy Director for Intelligence   Date

STAT

6 April 1965
Deputy Director for Plans   Date

STAT

29 Apl 65
Deputy Director for Science & Technology   Date

DD/S&T supports the recommendation of the CIA SIGINT Officer, seen in paragraph 5 of his attached memorandum, that recommendation 7 be disapproved.

The recommendations contained in this report are approved, _except for No. 7 which is disapproved._

STAT

8 May 1965
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick   Date
Executive Director-Comptroller

Distribution:
Orig. [   ] Adse (for return to D/Sec)
    2 - DDS (1 w/h)
    1 - DDI
    1 - DDP
    1 - DDS&T
    1 - ER

- 2 -
SECRET

SECRET

DD/S&T 1936-65

26 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director - Comptroller

SUBJECT: Review of Top Secret and Code Word Procedures and Controls

1. The following comments are submitted on those portions of the subject review dealing with conclusions regarding the handling and accountability of COMINT.

2. In Conclusion No. 7, the point is made that "there is an imbalance between the document control of non-Code Word Top Secret and COMINT Top Secret material, with the former having more stringent document controls for handling and destruction." Recommendation No. 7 goes on to state that "Procedures and controls for COMINT Top Secret documents (should) be brought into conformity with those for non-Code Word Top Secret documents, or if operational efficiency and/or administrative economy preclude such conformance, the situation be recognized officially by top management and reflected in Agency regulations."

3. The implication throughout this portion of the report is that handling of COMINT is based on administrative action within CIA, rather than on agreed-upon regulations. It should be pointed that COMINT security practices stem from an international agreement and from NSCID 6. DCID 6/3 represents community implementation of both these documents, and Agency Regulation 120 in turn is CIA implementation of DCID 6/3. CIA handling of COMINT is consistent with the rest of the U.S. intelligence community's practices, and in fact has "top management" recognition and regulatory control.

4. With regard to the "operational efficiency and/or administrative economy" aspect of COMINT security, a study was conducted in January 1953 by the Agency Organization and Methods Service which recommended that "complete registry controls for

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
SECRET

all or any portion of that COMINT within the Special Center not be instituted. "

5. In view of the above, I recommend that you disapprove both Conclusion No. 7 and Recommendation No. 7.

STAT

CIA SIGINT Officer

-2-

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## Report of the Committee on the Review of Top Secret and Code Word Procedures and Controls

MISSION

The Committee to survey the procedures and controls for the handling and accountability of Top Secret and Code Word material was formed as a result of an oral directive from the Executive Director-Comptroller to the Director of Security. The need for the survey was illustrated by the case of a former employee who had made copies of classified documents and removed them from an Agency building for personal use. The Office of Security furnished the Chairman and a member was appointed from the Office of Executive Director-Comptroller and from each of the Deputy Directorates. A list of Committee members and specialists who assisted the Committee will be found at Tab A. In undertaking its study, the Committee limited its inquiries to internal CIA controls and did not look into any of the features of the personnel security process.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting its survey the Committee concerned itself with the logging, receipting, transmission, distribution, reproduction and destruction of Top Secret, SI, T-KH, B and RD materials. Questionnaires were prepared and forwarded to the control points within the Agency and results were then analyzed to determine the principal problem areas. A sample questionnaire is attached (Tab B). The Committee then heard presentations from Agency specialists from each of the control offices, Chief, Records Administration Staff, Deputy Chief, Communications Security Staff and Chief, Security Staff of the Office of Logistics. These presentations described the problems identified by the results of the questionnaires. The Committee then visited selected control points within the Agency (NPIC, Special Clearance Center, DDI All Source Center and Cable Secretariat), in order to obtain first hand knowledge of the procedures and controls.

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
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion #1:

The Committee found that throughout the Agency there is unauthorized reproduction of Top Secret and certain types of Code Word material which must be eliminated.

Recommendation #1:

It is recommended that:

(a) The Director of Security caution all Agency employees against the unauthorized and uncontrolled reproduction of Top Secret or Code Word material. Such reminder should emphasize that unauthorized reproduction weakens our security safeguards and reflects seriously on the security consciousness of the individual.

(b) The Director of Security request the Deputy Director for Plans to have the Technical Services Division conduct a feasibility study for controlling the reproduction of documents on copying machines. The purpose would be to make unauthorized reproduction impossible without defacing the reproduced document or so marking it that it would be known on which machine it was reproduced.

(c) The Director of Security request the Chief of each Agency component having a copying machine to control use of the machine to ensure that there is no unauthorized or uncontrolled reproduction.

Conclusion #2:

The Committee found an awkward arrangement in the handling of Top Secret and SI documents sent from one agency to another in that each receiving agency puts an internal control number on the document and that number is the one used as the internal reference number. When an inquiry is made from the originating agency the cross referencing becomes an involved process. Uniform numbering systems have been established

for T-KH and B as well as for information reports and have been found to be working efficiently and economically.

Recommendation #2:

It is recommended that:

(a) A uniform numbering system be established within the intelligence community and that blocks of numbers be given to each department or agency originating Top Secret, RD and SI documents and the same number be used by the receiving department or agency.

(b) The Chairman of the Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board be requested to use his Committee in coordination with CODIB as the vehicle to devise a uniform numbering system and submit appropriate recommendations to USIB.

Conclusion #3:

The questionnaire and presentations of the control officers revealed that control personnel and users of Top Secret and Code Word material have not adhered strictly to existing regulations for the handling and control of such material. This has been caused in part by existing regulations not being sufficient, clear and current and in many instances lacking practicality.

Recommendation #3:

It is recommended that:

(a) All Agency officers responsible for the control of Code Word and Top Secret material review existing regulations to make certain that they conform with present requirements and acceptable practices including those recommended in this report.

(b) All Agency officers responsible for the control of Code Word and Top Secret material initiate a reindoctrination program for all control center personnel followed by a similar program for the users of Top Secret and Code Word material.

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SECRET

Conclusion #4:

The Committee found that there is a multiplicity of logging, document receipt and courier receipt forms. Some of these forms have been created to serve a special purpose and are deemed necessary. The Committee found that a form which serves a dual purpose for courier and document receipt would improve document control by setting up a chain of responsibility from originator to recipient.

Recommendation #4:

It is recommended that:

(a) Where there is a need for both a courier and document receipt in the transmission of Top Secret and Code Word material, the attached Package and Document Receipt Form and procedures (Tab C) be used. This form should be prepared for printing by the Records Administration Staff after coordination with Agency control officers and after appropriate refinements have been made. The form should be of a distinctive color and be on NCR paper.

(b) At the conclusion of a six month trial period, if the use of this form proves successful within the Agency, the Director of Security bring it to the attention of the Security Committee of USIB for possible adoption by other agencies and departments of the intelligence community.

(c) At the conclusion of a six month trial period, the Records Administration Staff consider use of a similar form, on white paper, for the transmission of Secret material requiring both a package and document receipt.

Conclusion #5:

The Committee found that throughout the Agency there are numerous follow-up procedures to ensure that documents were actually received by the intended recipient. The time interval prior to certain follow-ups for document receipts varies from one week to two months depending on the Agency control point.

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Recommendation #5:

It is recommended that:

Each Agency control officer of Top Secret and Code Word material issue instructions that the maximum period of time allowed to elapse prior to sending a follow-up for a document receipt be set at two weeks plus elapsed courier time.

Conclusion #6:

In review of the control procedures the Committee members found considerable discrepancy in the methods of survey and accountability procedures.

(a) The CIA Top Secret control procedures do not require an annual inventory although some spot checks have been made in the past and some areas have conducted inventories.

(b) No annual inventory is required in the B System and no inventory has been conducted although spot checks have been made.

(c) No annual inventory is required of T-KH material. Within the T-KH system the TSO/CIA conducts surveys which include review of document control procedures by spot checking to ensure that controls being applied are in accord with T regulations.

(d) In the COMINT System no inventory is required nor are documents accountable among components and personnel within a special center although documents are accountable when moving from center to center or to components outside centers. A record is also kept of the components to which the documents are originally sent by the initial receipt point within the center. Documents are circulated within a center without a receipt and may be destroyed by the recipient without recording or destruction certificates.

(e) No annual inventory is conducted of RD material received within CIA. Occasionally RD control officers of various components have been called upon to report the amount of RD material on hand.

(f) The Committee found that due to the volume and rapid movement of control documents a total inventory would be impracticable and unmanageable.

Recommendation #6:

It is recommended that:

(a) The Top Secret Control Officer, the COMINT Security Officer, the TSO/CIA and BSO/CIA and the CIA Officer in Charge of Restricted Data conduct surveys of the accountability procedures for Top Secret, COMINT, Restricted Data, B and T-KH documents.

(b) Such surveys should include spot checks of controlled material as well as the logging, receipting and destruction procedures.

(c) Advance knowledge of impending surveys would be limited to the Chief of the component or area being surveyed.

(d) Surveys will be conducted in a manner to ensure that material is available or accounted for within the approved procedures. Such surveys shall be conducted at least annually unless unusual circumstances dictate the need for more frequent inspections.

Conclusion #7:

The Committee found that there is an imbalance between the document control of non-Code Word Top Secret and COMINT Top Secret material with the former having more stringent document controls for handling and destruction. This inconsistency has been based on the premise that the volume of COMINT Top Secret in certain areas is so large that strict application of the regular Top Secret controls would be time consuming, expensive and would impede efficiency of operations. However, no such reasons appear to be recognized under EO 10501 (as revised by EO 10816 and EO 10964), which states that heads of agencies shall prescribe accountability procedures that are particularly severe on material classified Top Secret, and Agency regulations do not provide for any exception. The

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difference in the handling of Top Secret COMINT documents adversely influences the handling of non-Code Word Top Secret documents and could account for the large number of the latter that have been missing in physical inventories.

Recommendation #7:

It is recommended that:

Procedures and controls for COMINT Top Secret documents be brought into conformity with those for non-Code Word Top Secret documents, or if operational efficiency and/or administrative economy preclude such conformance, the situation be recognized officially by top management and reflected in Agency regulations.

Conclusion #8:

The Committee realizes that there is a need for the expeditious handling of non-Code Word Top Secret cables and a simultaneous need to tighten controls of access to and dissemination of these cables. It has been ascertained that the average monthly volume of CIA Top Secret cables received in the Cable Secretariat is 224 and of non-CIA Top Secret cables is 117. The Committee realizes that the use of a Top Secret cover sheet on the cables distributed to Agency components would delay to some extent their expeditious processing.

Recommendation #8:

It is recommended that:

The format presently being used for Top Secret cables be revised to include a block for the initials of each individual who reads the cable after it leaves the Cable Secretariat.

Conclusion #9:

A review of the results of questions on controls of release of Top Secret and Code Word material to contractors disclosed a variance in procedures. In some areas it was noted that there was no central point through which contractors were controlled when they visited the Agency.

In addition, the security clearances of the contractors were not always ascertained and the need to know determined. In some instances contractor personnel were not required to sign for having read or handled Top Secret documents.

Recommendation #9:

It is recommended that:

(a) The Deputy Directors ensure that all project officers responsible for external contracts so monitor them that all releases of Top Secret and Code Word information be made under the direction of the project officer. The project officer should make certain:

(1) That the need to know principle is followed.

(2) That discussions with contractor personnel are conducted in an appropriate private area.

(3) That the contractor's representative possesses the proper security clearances.

(4) That contractor personnel sign for all types of Top Secret material that they have read or handled.

(b) The Deputy Directors caution all employees of the necessity for them to go through the responsible project officer prior to releasing Top Secret and Code Word material to contractor personnel.

8

Recipients of Package

(All Couriers, Courier Supervisors, Registries, and
Others Receiving Packages)

1. Examine package and note on back of receipt any material change
   in original condition of package which indicates possible unauthorized
   disclosure of the contents.

2. First recipient of package sign package portion of receipt on copy
   No. 6, the "hold back" copy, giving date and time received.

3. Other recipients of package sign top package receipt (Nos. 2 through 5)
   and leave copy with person from whom package is received.

Recipient of Document

(Registry, Addressee or Other Person Authorized
to Open Package)

1. Verify contents of package, checking description of contents on Copy
   No. 1 or attached list.

2. Acknowledge receipt of document(s) by signing Copy No. 1, giving
   date and time received.

3. Log in document, showing Package and Document Receipt No. for
   reference in case of follow-up.

4. Place unclassified, intra-Agency receipts in outgoing box for return
   by courier to sender. Return inter-Agency receipts to sender in
   envelope. In unusual circumstances where sender has found it necessary
   to classify the document receipt portion of the form or an attached
   listing of documents, return Copy No. 1 (and any accompanying list)
   via appropriate channels, using procedures prescribed for the
   particular material.

TAB C

USE TYPEWRITER OR BALL-POINT PEN ON HARD SURFACE

Approximately 1½x actual size

PACKAGE AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT	DATE	RECEIPT NO.
TO		
SENDER		

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT(S)

CLASSIFICATION	DOCUMENT NO.
COPY NUMBERS	DOCUMENT DATE

TYPE OF PACKAGE	RECEIVED IN GOOD CONDITION OR AS NOTED ON OTHER SIDE		
	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME
☐ SEALED ENVELOPE			
☐ SEALED PARCEL			
☐ LOCKED BAG			
☐ OTHER (DESCRIBE)			

SHORT TITLE AND ATTACHMENTS IF APPROPRIATE (PREFERABLY UNCLASSIFIED, BUT IF NOT USE APPROPRIATE CHANNELS AND PROCEDURES FOR RETURN OF RECEIPT)

☐ SEE ATTACHED LIST WITH ABOVE RECEIPT NO.

RECIPIENT OF PACKAGE: SIGN ABOVE. GIVE COPY TO PERSON FROM WHOM RECEIVING PACKAGE.
RECIPIENT OF DOCUMENT: SIGN AND RETURN TO SENDER THE RECEIPT INSIDE PACKAGE. (1)

SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S)	DATE
	TIME